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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES B. JACKSON,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v

]
]

-

DALE DOCKSTADER, d/b/a THE
j
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS;
]
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE; NORMAN )
SWAPP; ERIC LUNDLOW; WASHINGTON )
COUNTY; THE STATE OF UTAH; AND ]
DOES I through CC,
]
1
Defendants/Appellees.
;

Supreme Court No. 920162

Fifth Judicial District Court
Civil No. 910500135 CV
Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE NORMAN SWAPP
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

from

two

orders

dismissing

Plaintiff/Appellants civil actions, the second amounting to final
judgment,

entered

by

the

Fifth

Judicial

District

Court

of

Washington County, pursuant to motions for summary judgment. Said
Orders are dated December 2, 1991 and January 6, 1992 respectively.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under § 78-2-2(3) (j)
Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The sole issue on appeal pertaining to Defendant/Appellee
Norman Swapp

(hereinafter

Swapp)

is whether

the lower court

correctly granted Swapp's motion for summary judgment dismissing
Plaintiff/Aappellant Charles B. Jackson's

(hereinafter Jackson)

Section 1983 civil rights action against Swapp on the grounds that
§ 1983 requires the violation of federal, not state law; that the

existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to a
§ 19 83 civil rights claim based on allegations of illegal arrest;
and, that Swapp had probable cause for the arrest of Jackson for
the crime of Theft of Services, § 76-6-409, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended) a class B misdemeanor.
Summary Judgement is appropriate where there exists no
genuine issue of material fact.

Utah State Retirement Office v.

Salt Lake County, 780 P.2d 813, 814-15

(Utah 1989).

Because

summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a
challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of
law.

Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24,

25 (Utah 1990). The trial court's legal conclusions supporting the
grant of summary judgment must be upheld if they are correct
conclusions of law based on the facts.

Id.

In making this

determination, the trial court's conclusions are accorded no
particular deference.

Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506

(Utah 1990), citing City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement
Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068 (Utah 1985).

In considering an appeal of a grant of summary

judgment the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most
favorable to the appealing party and, in determining whether those
facts require, as a matter of law, entry of judgment for the
prevailing party, the appellate court gives no deference to the
trial

court's

correctness.

conclusions

of

law,

which

are

reviewed

for

See, Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d

634 (Utah 1989) , Barber v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d
2

248

(Utah App. 1988) , Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance

Company. 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986).
Appellant may raise on appeal, only those issues actually
litigated in the lower court. Macaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938 (U*:ah
1987) . If an issue is not raised in the moving or opposing papers,
at the time of the hearing of the motion, or in the lower court's
order, it is not ripe for appeal.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this
Section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Summary Judgment (b) For defending party.
A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 21, 1992, Plaintiff/Appellant Charles B. Jackson
filed an action against Dale Dockstader, d/b/a/ The Cliffrose Lodge
and Gardens; the Town of Springdale; Norman Swapp; Eric Ludlow;
Washington County; The State of Utah; and Does 1 through CC,
alleging False Arrest; Malicious Prosecution: Allowing a Business
3

to Operate under an Improper Occupancy Permit; Abuse of Process;
and, and violation of Plaintiff's Civil Rights in violation of the
Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, section 1983,
arising out Jackson's Arrest in Washington County, Utah. (Jackson's
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pp. 4-7).
On

September

19, 1991

the parties

entered

into a

stipulation agreeing to dismiss all of Jackson's claims except the
claim of Malicious Prosecution against Dockstader and a claim of a
§ 1983 civil rights violation against Swapp in his personal
capacity.

(ORDER OF DISMISSAL p.l).
On November 21, 1991 a hearing was held on Swapp's Motion

to Dismiss the § 1983 action.

After reviewing all relevant

documents in the record and hearing arguments from both counsel,
the trial court granted Swapp's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
(ORDER OF DISMISSAL p.2).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes

of

the

issues

raised

on appeal, the

pertinent facts are those set forth in the stipulation of facts
entered into by Jackson and Swapp.

(Amended Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of Defendant Norman Swapp's Motion to
Dismiss the § 1983 Claim - Filed November 18, 1991, STIPULATED
FACTS pp. ii - viii).

Those stipulate facts are as follows:

1.

In anticipation of an upcoming family trip, Charles B. Jackson
made reservations for lodging at the Cliffrose Lodge, located
in Springdale Utah, for March 24, 1989.

2.

This incident occurred during the Easter weekend, a high
volume period for a tourist oriented business like the Lodge.

4

The Cliffrose Lodge is a small motel operation consisting of
36 rental units.
The office of the Cliffrose Lodge had a posted closing time of
11:00 p.m. during the period in question.
Jackson arrived at the Cliffrose Lodge at approximately 5:30
p.m. on Friday, March 24, 1989 and checked into the motel,
making payment for the room at that time by credit card.
Jackson informed hotel staff that the room would be used by
his son, who was probably on his way and would arrive later
that evening.
Jackson's notification to hotel staff that his son would come
to the hotel desk at a later time to obtain a key to the room
was noted and approved.
Jackson did not notify hotel staff that his son would be
arriving after the office's closing time.
Jackson was never informed that the office would not be open
and staffed all night.
Jackson notified motel staff that his wife and his son's seven
year old daughter, Melissa, would occupy the room until his
son arrived.
Jackson got up a number of times throughout the night to see
if his son had arrived at the motel, each time with negative
results.
The Plaintiff's wife stayed throughout the night with Melissa,
waiting for Melissa's fathers' arrival. The son, (Melissa's
father), had never arrived at the motel.
Contrary to the assurances of motel manager Dockstader, that
there would be a key available for the son, at approximately
9:30 a.m. Jackson was notified by his son that he had arrived
at the Cliffrose Lodge at approximately 12:30 on Saturday
March 25, 1989 to find that the office was closed and locked.
Jackson's son being unable to raise any staff at the motel,
had left and obtained lodging at the Zion Lodge.
After learning that his son was unable to find any staff at
12:30 a.m., Plaintiff demanded that the motel either pay for
the room at Zion's lodge or not charge for their room where
Jackson's wife and grandchild had stayed.
When Jackson's demand was refused by Dockstader, Jackson
requested the return of the charge slip that he had signed the
5

night before. When Jackson was given the slip he tore it into
pieces and informed the motel clerk that he refused to pay for
the room.
Jackson left the motel and drove to the entrance of Zion's
Park.
At approximately 2:20 p.m. on Saturday March 25, 1989,the
owner of the Cliffrose Motel, Dale Dockstader, reported a
theft of services (a class B misdemeanor § 76-6-409 (3)
U.C.A.) to the Washington County Sheriff's Office.
Dockstader provided the Sheriff's office with a description of
Jackson's vehicle.
The Washington County Sheriff's office was notified that when
Jackson had left the motel he stated that he would not be back
in contact with the motel.
When Jackson arrived at Zion's Park he was informed by a
Ranger that the Cliffrose Lodge had called the park to inform
the rangers that Jackson had left without paying for the room
which his family had used.
Because traffic into the park was backing up the Ranger
processed Jackson into the Park.
When Jackson was approached by another Ranger inside the Park
who informed Jackson that he would be required to accompany
the Ranger, Jackson replied that he believed the matter to be
a civil dispute and that he had wasted enough time already and
would not accompany the officer unless the officer provided
him with good reason.
When Jackson was informed that the County Sheriff's Office had
asked the Park Rangers to arrest Jackson, Jackson explained
what had happened on the previous night and cautioned the
Rangers not to get involved.
After telling Jackson they would convey his side of the story
to the County Sheriffs office, but that they may have to
return for him, they allowed Jackson to leave.
Later in the day, Jackson was approached inside Zion's Park by
deputy Norman Swapp of the Washington County Sheriff's office,
who notified Jackson that the owner of the Cliffrose Motel had
reported that Jackson had skipped on his motel bill.
When deputy Swapp asked Jackson to accompany him back to the
Motel in Springdale, Jackson informed the officer that he
intended to go hiking with his family and would take care of
this matter later.
6

Deputy Swapp then informed Jackson that if Jackson did not
voluntarily go back to Springdale that the deputy would have
to arrest Jackson, Jackson walked from the deputy towards the
motor home.
Jackson ultimately agreed to return to the motel to discuss
the matter with motel manager Mr. Dockstader. Jackson asked
his son to accompany him and deputy Swapp to Springdale, a
request which deputy Swapp agreed to.
Jackson, his son and deputy Swapp returned to the Cliffrose
Lodge where Mr. Dockstader informed Jackson that if Jackson
did not pay for the room he had registered for and used then
as the owner and manager, he would file a criminal complaint
against Jackson.
Jackson informed deputy Swapp that he was not going to pay for
the room.
When Jackson questioned deputy Swapp about the consequences of
the complaint, the deputy replied that if a criminal complaint
was filed he would have to arrest Jackson.
During this exchange the officer expressed to Jackson that the
Easter weekend was a very busy time for the Sheriff's Office
and that as a Deputy he would prefer that the issue be
resolved between Jackson and the motel owner rather than
proceeding to the arrest of Jackson.
Jackson stated that if "working it out" required him to pay
for something he did not feel was owing, he would not do so.
When Jackson then stated that he would like to call his
attorney, the deputy denied his request, stating that Jackson
would have to come with him.
When Jackson expressed concern about the effect that the
ongoing action was having on his family and requested that
deputy Swapp take them back into the Park to meet with the
family, deputy Swapp agreed.
While driving back into the Park, deputy Swapp told Jackson
that he was going to arrest Jackson and transport him to St.
George to be booked.
When Jackson asked what the particular charges were going to
be filed against him, the deputy replied that he did not know
at that point in time.
When Jackson, his son and deputy Swapp arrived at Jackson's
motor home, Jackson asked the deputy for time to talk to his
wife and get a sandwich, which the officer agreed to.
7

40.

After Jackson informed his family that he was being arrested,
the deputy read Jackson his Miranda rights and declined to
allow Jackson to call his attorney at that time.
Swapp
refused to allow the Plaintiff's son to accompany them to the
jail in St. George. During this time Swapp revealed his
handcuffs and said to the Plaintiff, "I guess I won't have to
use these, will I?"

41.

Jackson, without restraints was transported to the Washington
County Jail in St. George. Plaintiff rode to St.George, Utah
in Officer Swapp's car with an elderly couple who were
hitchhiking a ride to an RV Park south of St. George.

42.

Deputy Swapp and Jackson arrived at the County Jail at
approximately 6:00 p.m. and because the jail officers were
busy, had to wait to complete the booking process.

43.

At the time, Plaintiff was arrested, there was no written
complaint or citation from Dockstader.

44.

While waiting for completion of the booking process, Jackson
asked deputy Swapp if he could use the telephone. Swapp
replied that while he was unable to use the phone at that time
he would be allowed to make a call at a later time.

45.

Jackson was informed at the jail that he would be charged with
theft of services.

46.

Jackson was finger printed and had his picture taken as apart
of the booking process, but was not searched.

47.

The jail officer informed Jackson that bail for theft of
services was $150.00. When Jackson informed the officer that
he did not have that much on him the Jail officers determined
that he could be released on his own recognizance.

48.

At the time he was booked, charged and then released, no
written complaint or citation had been filed. Nor was such
filed at the time of arraignment on March 27, 1989.

49.

Charges for theft of services were filed against Jackson, but
were later dismissed at the motion of the County Attorney's
office.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Jackson's arguments in points I and II of his brief focus

on his contention that the trial court was precluded from granting
a summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists
8

and that Swapp's arrest of Jackson violated Jackson's federal civil
rights.

Jackson's unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations lack

merit as well as record support,
ARGUMENT
Jackson argues that the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment upon the stipulated facts.

This Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power
&

Water,

Inc..

789

P.2d

24,25

(Utah

1990).

Therefore

in

determining whether summary judgment was properly granted this
court must focus on whether a material issue of fact existed and if
not whether Swapp was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
POINT I
THERE IS NO GENUINE MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT WHICH WOULD
PRECLUDE THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
This Court has held that a genuine issue of fact only
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable
minds could differ on whether the defendants conduct measures up to
the required standard.

Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126

(1967) (as cited in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah
1982).

The lower court's decision was based on cross motions for

summary judgment based on stipulated facts. These stipulate facts
constitute the factual record in this case.

Thus the question

becomes whether, on the basis of the stipulated facts in the
record, reasonable minds could have differed as to whether Swapp
9

violated Jackson's federal civil rights. If reasonable minds could
not differ, then summary judgment was proper and must be upheld.
Jackson contends that the lower court altered or modified
the stipulated facts in determining when Jackson's arrest occurred.
He claims that this modification created a material issue of fact.
In support of this proposition he contends that the lower court
determined that the arrest occurred in Zion's Park (fact number 28)
rather than when Swapp and Jackson returned to the CIiffrose Motel
(fact number 30, 32, 37) as stated in the stipulated facts.
When an arrest occurs, generally, turns on the facts of
the case, not the language expressing those facts.

The United

States Supreme Court has held that for Fourth Amendment purposes,
a person is arrested when, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he or she was not free to leave. United State v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980) . There is no requirement that the word arrest
be used at all.

Even though there is no physical restraint,

circumstances such as the threatening presence of the officer, the
display of a weapon by an officer, or even "the use of language or
tone of voice indicting that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled" can constitute an arrest.

Id at 544.

In light of the fact that when Deputy Swapp talked to
Jackson in Zion's Park and informed Jackson that if Jackson did not
voluntarily go back to Springdale that the deputy would have to
arrest Jackson, (fact number 28) the court is correct in concluding
that Jackson would have believed that he was not free to leave and
10

that if he refused to comply with Swapp's request that he would
have been compelled to comply.

Therefore, despite the fact that

the stipulated facts indicate that the word arrest was not used
until Swapp and Jackson returned to the Cliffrose Motel, the court
was correct in determining that Jackson was arrested in Zion's Park
and that no material issue of fact exists regarding that issue.
POINT II
SWAPP IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff's federal civil rights claim is based upon
alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress.
For purposes of this
Section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
In any § 1983 action, the court's initial inquiry must
focus on whether two essential elements are present:
(1)

whether the conduct complained of was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and,

(2)

whether

this

conduct

deprived

a

person

of

rights,

privileges and immunities secured by federal law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, (1981).
In this case, there is no dispute that Deputy Norman
Swapp was acting under color of state law when he arrested Charles
R. Jackson on the charge of theft of services.
11

The question

presented here is whether the arrest deprived the Plaintiff of any
right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal, not state, law.
Plaintiff
applicable
searches

claimed that his arrest was unlawful under

state law, and thus his right against

and

seizures

or having

liberty

deprived

unreasonable
without

due

process and equal protection were violated.
In Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430
States

Supreme

Court

recognized

that

"[t]he

(1990), the United
elements

of, and

defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law."
Under federal law an officer may make a warrantless arrest if there
is probable cause - facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant
a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense.

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). .

Section 76-6-409, Theft of Services, Utah Code Annotated
1987, provides:
(1)

a person commits theft if he obtains services which he
knows are available only for compensation by deception,
threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the
due payment of them.

(2)

a person

commits

theft

if, having

control

over

the

disposition of services of another, to which he knows he
is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own
benefit, or to the benefit of another who he knows is not
entitled to them.
(3)

In this section, "services" includes, but is not limited
to,

labor, professional
12

service, public

utility

and

transportation

services,

restaurant,

hotelf

motel#

tourist cabin, rooming house or like accommodations, the
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for
temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam,
admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events,
or other events for which a charge is made.
Section

76-6-412(1) (d) ,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1977,

provides:
(1)

Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(d) As a class B misdemeanor

if the value of the

property stolen was $100.00 or less.
The stipulated facts clearly demonstrate that Deputy
Swapp had reasonable cause to believe that a criminal offense had
been or was being committed. The Plaintiff rented a motel room and
members of his family used the motel room.

When a dispute over

whether any payment was owing arose between Charles Jackson and
Dale Dockstader, Jackson ripped up the motel's credit card receipt
evidencing Jackson's agreement to pay for the room, informed the
motel clerk that he refused to pay for the room and then left the
vicinity without paying for the motel room.
A

reasonable police officer would believe

that the

conduct of the Plaintiff in using and then not paying for the use
of the room constituted the crime of theft of services within the
meaning of Section 76-6-409, Utah Code Annotated 1987, and would
believe that the Plaintiff both attempted to destroy the written
13

evidence of the service that was provided and attempted to flee the
area to avoid his arrest.
Jackson argues that Swapp did not have probable cause to
arrest Jackson because he did not have an arrest warrant and "knew
or should have known that the alleged crime was a misdemeanor"
(Jackson's Appellant Brief, page 16 paragraph 2).
All that the federal constitutional law requires is that
the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that some
offense has been committed.

Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770 (9th

Cir. 1990)(requirement that a misdemeanor must be committed in an
officer's presence is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment).

The

stipulated facts on record underlying the lower court's decision
show facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense.

Therefore the fact that Jackson had allegedly committed

only a misdemeanor does not negate the validity of his arrest and
does not constitute a violation of his federal civil rights.
Plaintiff's second basis for claiming that his arrest was
not lawful appears to be the principle that

"evidence which

establishes no more than a breach of an express or implied contract
is a purely civil matter and is insufficient to prove theft of
services". The fact that Plaintiff was able to get the prosecutor
to drop criminal charges based upon that principle does not mean
that Deputy Swapp should be held liable for unlawful arrest where
Swapp had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed a
crime. The evidence in this case shows that the Plaintiff not only
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violated an express or implied contract but attempted to destroy
the documentary evidence of that agreement and fled the vicinity to
avoid being arrested for that conduct. That the Plaintiff thought
that he was justified in doing so, does not negate the fact that a
reasonable police officer could have believed probable

cause

existed that Plaintiff committed the crime of theft of services and
that Plaintiff was subject to a warrantless arrest under federal
standards,
POINT III
SWAPP DID NOT ATTEMPT TO COMPEL JACKSON TO NEGOTIATE
A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WITH DOCKSTADER
UNDER THE THREAT OF ARREST.
Jackson has alleged that Swapp had no authority to
attempt or arrange civil resolution of the dispute between Jackson
and Dockstader and violated Jackson's civil right to due process
and equal protection by compelling him to negotiate settlement of
the dispute under threat of arrest.
To prevail on an alleged violation of equal protection,
plaintiff must present facts showing that he was subjected to
discriminatory treatment not rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S.

450, 457-58 (1988); Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th
Cir.

1988).

Strict scrutiny will not be invoked unless the

challenged government action discriminates against a suspect class
or interferes with a fundamental right.
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Jackson has not marshalled facts showing that he is a
member of a suspect class. Jackson has also not shown that Swapp's
statement to Jackson that the "Easter weekend was a very busy time
for the Sheriff's Office and that as a Deputy he would prefer that
the issue be resolved between Jackson and the motel owner rather
than proceeding to the arrest of Jackson" (STATEMENT OF THE FACTS,
number 33) was an attempt to compel Jackson to negotiate settlement
of the dispute with Dockstader, under threat of arrest.

Jackson

has also failed to show that Swapp's statement interfered with
Jackson's fundamental rights.
The stipulated facts contained in the record indicate
that Swapp did not threaten to initiate criminal proceedings
against Jackson if he failed to satisfy a civil debt.

Rather the

facts support the lower courts decision that Swapp had probable
cause to arrest Jackson for theft of services, and that he did
everything in his power to treat Jackson reasonably and tried to
avoid arresting Jackson if at all possible.

(Order of Dismissal,

page 2, paragraph 2).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial
court

granting

defendant/appellee

Swapp's Motion

for Summary

Judgment should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 1992.

Lynn L
Attord
Appellee NormasrSwapp
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CLL:v.
DEPU"

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES B. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
DALE DOCKSTADER, d/b/a THE
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS;
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE;
NORMAN SWAPP; ERIC LUDLOW;
WASHINGTON COUNTY; THE STATE
OF UTAH; AND DOES I THROUGH CC,

Civil NO. 910500135 CV

Defendants.
This matter came regularly before the court on the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss filed August 15, 1991.
On August 28, 1991, Plaintiff filed Objection and supporting
memorandum and affidavit.

On September 14, 1991, the Defendants'

filed a Reply Memorandum.

On September 19, 1991, at the hearing

set for that motion, counsel for the parties announced that they
had agreed to meet to discuss settlement.

The meetings that were

held thereafter resulted in a stipulation agreeing to dismiss all
claims against all parties except: (1) the claims brought against
Dale Dockstader d/b/a Cliffrose Lodge, and (2) THE § 1983 ACTION
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST DEPUTY SWAPP IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY.

Defendant counsel agreed not to seek attorney's fees.

Another hearing was set for November 21, 1991 and Defendant
Swapp filed an amended memorandum focusing on the issues presented
by the § 1983 claim against Deputy Swapp in his personal capacity•
At the November 21, 1991 hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the § 1983 civil rights action against Deputy Swapp in his
personal capacity, the Court after reviewing all relevant documents
in the record, heard the arguments of both counsel in the premises,
and found: (1) Section 1983 requires the violation of federal, not
state law; (2) existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute
defense to the § 1983 civil rights claim based upon a false arrest;
(3) Washington County Deputy Sheriff Swapp, had probable cause for
the arrest of Charles B. Jackson, Plaintiff herein, for the crime
of theft of services, § 76-6-409, a class B misdemeanor; (4) Even
if Deputy Swapp had lacked sufficient probable cause to make that
arrest, his reasonable belief that probable cause existed based on
the facts and circumstances he was aware of would have justified a
grant of qualified immunity in this case; and (5) Deputy Swapp did
everything in his power to treat Charles B. Jackson reasonably and
tried to avoid arresting Mr. Jackson, if possible.
THEREFORE, good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Deputy Norman Swapp's
Motion to dismiss the § 1983 civil rights action against Swapp in
his personal capacity is granted; Plaintiff Jackson's Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice as against Deputy Swapp, having already
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been dismissed as against all other named Defendants except Dale
Dockstader d/b/a Cliffrose Lodge,

Each party is responsible for

his own costs, attorney's fees and interestDated this

$-?£-

day of

^JL^^J^

1991,
BY THE COURT:

^

^

^

.

"

^

^

-

A / Philip E^es
District Cou;
urt Judge
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